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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to develop the argument that sentiments (including moral 
sentiments) are endemic to the building of knowledge about the economy, as well as 
the functioning of the economy itself. This contrasts with the mainstream treatment of 
sentiment as separable from rationality, such that it is seen (if at all) as requiring an ex 
post modification of rational choice theory. The case of moral hazard is considered, 
first in its mainstream interpretation in terms of rationality, and then in terms of an 
alternative approach where knowledge and behaviour are built on (moral) sentiments. 
The implications are drawn for how we understand the financial crisis, and the 
appropriate policy response. 
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Introduction 
 
The severity of the financial crisis which first became apparent in 2007 has provoked 
widespread public discussion about the structure and behaviour of the financial sector. 
During the long financial boom which preceded the crisis, the confidence in that 
structure and behaviour was evident from a relative absence of public scrutiny. The 
pro-market philosophy which dominated the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s supported 
the view that competitive financial markets would produce a socially-optimal 
outcome. For individual firms and households, the financial sector and the related 
property sector with their rising asset prices held out the prospect of gains which 
discouraged any probing. 
 
But the crisis changed all that. There has been extensive discussion in policy circles 
and among the public at large about the nature of the crisis, what caused it, and what 
should be done about it. Much of this discussion has had a moral focus. Was the crisis 
brought on by greed? If banks had caused the crisis, should taxpayers’ money be used 
to provide subsidized liquidity to keep them afloat? If individual bankers had actively 
exposed their institutions to the risks which threatened these institutions’ viability, 
should they still be awarded large bonuses? These arguments refer to the principle of 
fairness with respect to taking the consequences of one’s actions. Fairness is one 
principle which Akerlof and Shiller (2007) discuss under the umbrella of ‘animal 
spirits’, by which they mean any motivation for behaviour which falls outside the 
conventional economics understanding of rationality. 
 
The other area for discussion with respect to morals is moral hazard. This concept 
arguably poses the most interesting questions for economic discourse. Mainstream 
economic discourse normally avoids discussions of morals as being outside the 
purview of economics. Akerlof and Shiller depart from this approach by bringing the 
moral concept of fairness into the discourse. Nevertheless they maintain the strict 
division between rationality and morals. But moral hazard is a concept which is 
employed in mainstream analysis which focuses on rational behaviour, usually with 
respect to information asymmetry. It is opportunistic behaviour, ie behavior which 
takes advantage of an opportunity for personal benefit even if it is at the expense of 
others.1 But is it immoral? The ambiguity of moral hazard as a concept arises from the 
possibility that it can be captured as rational behaviour. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the concept of moral hazard in relation to the 
financial crisis, with a view to suggesting a policy response. Concern with moral 
hazard was central to the way in which the authorities responded initially to the onset 
of crisis. But first we set out the much broader context of the relation between morals, 
ethics and economics, exploring how far they can in fact be kept separate. We explore 
the background to the history of economics as a moral science. There is an extensive 
literature about (moral) values in economic theory (see eg Brennan and Waterman, 
eds, 1994; Peil and van Staveren, eds, 2009). Morals can be identified in economics at 
a variety of levels, but the way in which they appear in economic theory depends on 
the methodological framework: the closed-system rational-choice framework or any 
of the open-system political economy frameworks. As a result the literature has 
                                                 
1 ‘Personal benefit’ is to be read more generally to refer to the benefit of the active party, whether an 
individual or a company. Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) construct a powerful argument that mainstream 
theory suffers from its inattention to social preferences, for which there is substantial evidence. 
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involved a significant amount of talking at cross purposes, not least because of the 
different meanings attached to terms in the different frameworks. We will see that this 
will be significant for our discussion of moral hazard. 
 
We then approach the subject through the modern literature in psychology and 
economics which explores the separability or otherwise of cognition and sentiment (in 
particular moral sentiment). These two positions are then explored in terms of how we 
are to understand moral hazard. The discussion is opened up to consider morality in 
financial institutions more generally. This allows a discussion of the policy response 
to moral issues within the financial sector, which concludes the paper.  
 
 
Morals and Moral Hazard in Mainstream Theory 
 
Mainstream theory sets out to be positive in the sense of being value-free on the part 
of the economist, but providing the basis for others to make normative judgements. 
Indeed this methodological choice in favour of positivist economics rather than some 
other way of judging theories itself involves ideology, as Backhouse (2005) argues. 
Ideology involves a set of values (moral judgements, broadly understood), usually 
with a view to changing society. But the term also includes a way of understanding 
the world (an ontology) which arguably also carries over to morals more generally. To 
the extent that this is the case, there is therefore an epistemological angle also to 
morals – terms are given particular meanings, particular types of knowledge are 
regarded as acceptable or unacceptable, etc.  
 
But it is in any case well-established that mainstream economics in fact employs a 
consequentialist moral philosophy based on utilitarianism and hedonism 
(Drakopoulos 1991; Graafland 1991; Hirata 1991). Welfare economics employs the 
liberal (potential for) no-harm principle with respect to maximizing pleasure and 
minimizing pain. The overall framework therefore is not value-free. Yet the language 
used (‘rational’, natural’, etc) serves to reinforce the appearance of positivity that is 
(unreasonably) claimed. 
 
Nevertheless agents may adopt particular value systems (such as altruism with respect 
to the family) which can be incorporated in utility functions (see eg Becker 1976). 
Moral values are thus incorporated as preferences as to goals, or ends. There is no 
scope for incorporating moral preferences about means. In practice there are logistical 
limits to how far different preference sets can be operationalised, so that maximizing 
income subject to constraints remains the norm.  
 
There has however been growing interest in using game theory to model interactions, 
with the potential for expanding the scope for introducing moral values. Indeed Adam 
Smith’s (1759) Theory of Moral Sentiments has been invoked increasingly as a basis 
for introducing a social dimension to game theory analysis. Trust games would seem 
to introduce a moral dimension to relationships. However, this analysis has been 
shown by Hughes (2008) to collapse into optimising behaviour; individuals trust 
others when it is in their own calculative interests to do so. Any other incidence of 
trust is a sign of irrationality. 
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Indeed there are several indications in this literature that the word ‘moral’ is being 
used in the same way as the word ‘rational’. Adam Smith (1759) discusses the role of 
an impartial spectator, whom we imagine expressing moral judgements on our 
behaviour. The impartial spectator is thus a moral check on our passions, promoting 
the interests of society as a whole. But within the mainstream framework, Ashraf et al 
(2005) discuss the impartial spectator as the voice of reason (with respect to personal 
self-interest) which prevails over short-term sentiment.  
 
We find that the same applies to the word ‘moral’ in the expression ‘moral hazard’. 
As Dembe and Boden (2000) explain, moral hazard had been a term used over more 
than two centuries in discussions of insurance to refer to the possibility that insurance 
would encourage the insured party to take on additional risk in a way which could not 
effectively be monitored. From the 1960s the term appeared in the (mainstream) 
economics literature on decision-making under uncertainty (eg Arrow 1963), referring 
to the subjective attitude to risk (or expectation of utility). Arrow considered the 
incomplete market for health insurance, and the significance of uncertainty 
(unquantifiable risk) as to the incidence of illness and the efficacy of treatment, and 
the different knowledge on the latter on the part of the consumer and supplier. Almost 
by definition, where there is uncertainty there will not be a complete insurance 
market. Arrow discussed the role of social convention, and trust in the ethics of 
medical professionals as playing an important role in limiting the scope for moral 
hazard under uncertainty. The moral hazard on which Arrow focuses is only partly the 
incentive to increase demand for medical care, but more that medical professionals 
will alter treatment policy because of insurance; where market participants can 
influence the market, there is not a competitive equilibrium. Professional ethics are a 
constraint on moral hazard, implying that breach of ethics is immoral. Arrow 
considered solutions such as licensing arrangements for health professionals to 
monitor adherence to professional ethics.  
 
But the emphasis of the ensuing literature shifted away from fundamental uncertainty 
and ethics towards more conventional analysis of response to incentives. Thus, in a 
comment on Arrow, Pauly (1968: 535) put it that: ‘the response of seeking more 
medical care with insurance than in its absence is a result not of moral perfidy, but of 
rational economic behavior’. Within this more conventional mainstream analysis, if to 
be moral is to be rational, immoral behaviour is also rational. While the insurance 
literature made moral judgements on the behaviour of the insured, this economics 
literature intends no moral judgement. Thus in the other mainstream literature where 
moral hazard has arisen - credit rationing - the issue arises from borrowers concealing 
information from banks, who are unable to monitor the risk to which they are 
exposed. Information about risk (which borrowers are presumed to know) is 
concealed because there is an incentive to do so; were banks to identify higher risk, 
they would charge higher interest.  
 
In short therefore, moral hazard in the mainstream literature is a rational response to 
incentives to take on increased risk and to conceal information about this. No explicit 
ethical judgement is involved. There is however an implicit value judgement in the 
conclusion that markets are being prevented from achieving the socially-optimal 
outcome. But there would be no reason to expct rational individuals to behave 
otherwise. 
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Morals and Moral Hazard within Open-system Economics 
 
The role of morals is very different within a political economy framework, whose 
several schools of thought all employ some form of open-system framework, which 
allows for any or all of the following: evolutionary change in institutions, creative 
individual behaviour and changing relations between individuals. Institutional 
structures are an important source of stability in the face of an uncertain future 
(certain knowledge being limited by the openness of the economic system), and there 
is therefore a recognition of the importance of the social level (even if some schools 
of thought, eg neo-Austrians, notably in the work of Hayek) then focus on human 
agency. Indeed as Davis (2003) argues, individual identity is only defined in relation 
to others.  
 
This approach supports a different reading of Smith’s Moral Sentiments as analysing 
the social dimension to behaviour which underpins the functioning of society in 
general, and, by implication, markets in particular. There was considerable debate at 
the time on the origins of morals, but there was general concern about the 
establishment of ‘civil society’, which would provide the stable basis for commercial 
activity (Boyd 2008). Since Smith saw moral approval (on the part of others, or the 
imaginary impartial spectator) as important to our sense of ourselves, this provided a 
force for the cementing of social conventions. One of the most important of these 
conventions for the operation of markets is trust, that others will also follow the same 
conventions as ourselves. Breaking trust is then immoral, and undermines society.  
 
Conventions are a form of constraint on individual choice in markets which, in the 
mainstream approach, would imply an inability to achieve a social optimum. In the 
political economy approach, such moral constraints are what enable market (and 
indeed all social) behavior in the first place. 
 
According to this approach, far from economics being a positive science, economics 
is a moral science (Young 1997). Values are seen as being embedded in ontology 
(how the world is understood), in choice of methodology, in theory and policy, and in 
the subject matter (either at the social or individual level). Unlike the closed-system 
approach, it is not a matter of incorporating moral values at a later normative stage, 
since they are already in the foundations. Indeed the purpose of economic study was 
seen as promoting human betterment, where that included not only improved 
standards of living but also moral improvement. Hume and Smith saw the former as 
one way of promoting the latter, addressing fears at the time about the threat to moral 
values posed by commercial society. Insofar as individuals were incentivised by 
income, Smith (1759: IV.1.8) saw self-delusion, but with the positive externality of 
activities which promoted economic growth and thus improved living standards for 
others. But Smith himself emphasised the aim of living a life with propriety and self-
command (Montes 2004), an emphasis on means rather than ends which Hayek 
(1976: 3) later echoed. 
 
Not least because it refers to means rather than ends, within this approach the word 
‘moral’ means something different from ‘rational’. It refers primarily to social 
conventions as to what is desirable behaviour on the part of individuals (as well as 
institutions); this may or may not include religious principles. Moral hazard is 
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therefore also understood differently. While we saw that moral behaviour is subsumed 
in rational behaviour in mainstream economics, ie apparently with no value content, 
moral behaviour in the political economy approach means conformity to one or other 
socially-established moral convention. This is not the exercise of rational self-interest 
which could undermine society, but in the nature of the behaviour of (social) 
individuals within a successful society. Immoral behaviour then undermines society. 
Moral hazard therefore involves the risk that an individual or group will behave 
immorally, flouting moral conventions and breaching trust.  
 
This understanding of the nature and role of morals potentially has very wide 
application, ie wider than the mainstream application to insurance. While moral 
hazard applies in very specific circumstances in the mainstream literature 
(concealment of information which allows an unmonitored increase in risk-taking), 
moral hazard in the political economy literature is the risk that individuals threaten the 
functioning of markets. We will consider in more detail how these different 
understandings can be applied to the banking crisis in order to consider the 
relationship between rationality and moral sentiment. If morality is not the same as 
rationality in the political economy approach, is it then irrationality? 
 
 
Rationality and Sentiment 
 
It could be argued that the political economy understanding of moral behaviour is 
simply a more complex version of rationality – where social conventions themselves 
are the outcome of rational individual optimising behaviour. This will be important 
for policy discussions – is it just a matter of tailoring incentives so that rational 
behaviour will produce the best (moral) outcome? Before considering moral hazard in 
relation to the financial sector, therefore, the discussion will benefit from considering 
further the relation between rationality and emotion (as it is put in the mainstream 
framework) or between cognition and sentiment (including moral sentiment). Here 
again we see the importance of difference in framework: in mainstream theory 
morality is rationality, while in the open-systems approach, morality is the result of 
moral sentiments, which are prior to reason (see further Dow 2010).  
 
The large literature in behavioural economics is concerned with explaining the 
outcomes of experiments which suggest that individuals deviate from the rationality 
axioms. Given the structure of the mainstream theory which behavioural economists 
seek to modify, there are two possible locations for incorporating this behaviour: 
either there are cognitive problems limiting the scope for rational decision-making, or 
preferences are unconventional. The former possibility complements the New 
Keynesian literature on asymmetric information, where rational decision-makers have 
to resort to rules of thumb (making as much use as possible of what information is 
available). But where there are unconventional preferences, such as loss-aversion, or 
sentimental attachment to particular assets, the source is classified as the emotions. 
Following the old distinction between economics and psychology in terms of dealing 
with rationality and emotion respectively, this incorporation of psychology into 
economics is identified as paying explicit attention to irrationality.  
 
Nevertheless psychology has moved on, so that some fields within it address both 
cognition and emotion, and indeed there is debate as to how far intuitive behaviour is 
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‘as if’ rationality, or ‘as if’ rationality in a broader sense than that used in mainstream 
economics (see eg M Minsky 2006, Gigerenezer and Selten 2001, Gigerenzer 2007). 
Neuroscience goes so far as to argue that reason is an inadequate basis for decision-
making, since an emotional impulse is required (see eg Damasio 1994). The 
imagination of emotion can be seen to be critical even to utility maximization: 
pleasure and pain need to be imagined in order for the pleasure-pain principle to 
operate. This supports the argument developed by Hume and Smith, when forging 
their theory of human nature, that sentiment was prior to reason. They argued that it is 
the sentiment of wonder at unexplained phenomena which motivates the search for 
knowledge. Similarly it is conventional sentiments or beliefs (eg in existence) which 
underpin our understanding of the real world. Knowledge requires sentiment, so that 
reason and emotion are interconnected.  
 
Reason in this approach is therefore not the same as the rationality of the mainstream 
approach. When most knowledge is held with uncertainty (because the subject matter 
is open), there is reliance on conventional belief as well as intuition and what Keynes 
called ‘animal spirits’, or the urge to action (Dow and Dow 1985). It employs 
Keynesian ‘human logic’ rather than the classical logic of the mainstream approach 
(which requires certain knowledge of the truth-value of premises) (Gerrard 1992).  
 
What we are particularly concerned to understand here is the role of moral sentiments. 
Sentiment may be goal directed (even if self-deluding). But moral sentiment is more 
directed at means than ends: living a good life. It responds to the incentive of social 
approval (which may be internalised in the impartial spectator). Of course moral 
sentiments are not the only sentiments governing behaviour; behaviour may for 
example be governed by greed, responding to monetary incentives. But the argument 
here is that commercial society cannot function without the operation of some moral 
sentiments such that there is some foundation of trust in commercial relations. In 
other words it is inappropriate to assume that behaviour is opportunistic, driven by 
monetary incentives. Opportunistic behaviour, were it universal, would destroy social 
relations and undermine the functioning of the economy. We turn now to consider 
moral sentiment in the context of the financial sector. 
 
 
Moral Sentiment and the Financial Sector 
 
The financial sector is made up of institutions which are economic entities, but also 
social entities. They are organisations of people, and in this sector more than most the 
primary input is human capital. In considering moral hazard, the banking crisis, and 
policy to address them, we need to consider the sentiments which motivate behaviour 
at an individual and corporate level, and the institutional arrangements involved.  
 
First, as far as the corporate level is concerned, there is a large literature on corporate 
behaviour which demonstrates the scope for motivations other than profit 
maximization or maximisation of shareholder value. Corporations may be guided by a 
sense of social responsibility to sponsor charity events for example. As employers, 
they may exercise social responsibility by exercising the principle of fairness in 
dealing with employees. In both, management may be motivated to cultivate the good 
opinion of others – the outside world, customers and employees. Within 
organisations, and between employees and customers, even more than in society at 
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large, observance of some social norms is necessary for successful functioning. Thus 
for example traders who only meet electronically can censure other traders who flout 
convention. Individuals within organisations may be incentivised by the prospect of 
monetary bonuses, but even here there is considerable evidence that it is the 
recognition of success (the approval of others), and the measure of that recognition in 
relative monetary value, which is of primary importance – the actual monetary value 
is secondary.  
 
But these social conventions may not be moral. As Duran (2007) explains, the 
conditions which led to the Enron scandal arose because it became a social 
convention within large corporations to willfully deceive in their accounting practices. 
Accounting theory illustrates the uncertainty surrounding the ‘facts’ with respect to a 
company, in that the facts may be presented in a variety of ways and also interpreted 
in a variety of ways, such that companies can attempt to show their financial position 
in as favourable a light as possible. Accounting standards, professional accounting 
bodies, and company law are all designed to put bounds on this, which Enron 
overstepped. But there is still some scope here for moral hazard more generally, even 
within the law.    
Moral hazard in the financial sector has been analysed in relation both to loan 
contracts, and to state support for banks in the form of deposit insurance and the 
lender-of-last-resort facility. As far as the former is concerned, it relates to the 
relationship between borrower and lender. New Keynesian theory postulates 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of borrowers who conceal their increased risk 
exposure from the lender; were banks able to stipulate contracts to cover all the 
behaviour of borrowers, they could otherwise increase the interest charge in 
compensation (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). But if full knowledge of risk is impossible 
for lender and borrower, because in an open system objective risk cannot be 
measured, then what borrowers are concealing is not true risk. They may conceal 
information, and lenders may find it difficult to assess risk. But even if there were no 
concealment, lenders are unable to identify true risk, and therefore can only arrive at a 
judgment to which they attach higher weight. Ultimately, since neither party can have 
full understanding of the future path of the conditions under which the loan contract is 
made, the lender-borrower relationship relies on trust. The lender trusts the borrower 
not to flout the understanding on which the loan was made by intentionally taking on 
additional risk. The borrower trusts the lender to attempt to reschedule the loan if the 
borrower has difficulty servicing it. While mainstream theory would analyse trust 
effectively as the exercise of rational self-interest, the open-systems approach 
analyses it in terms of conventional understandings about the exercise of agency 
(Hughes 2008). Moral hazard is the danger that these understandings break down, 
eroding trust. 
The bank customer also faces moral hazard in a way similar to that between patient 
and health professional. The bank is regarded as having financial expertise, as well as 
a position of trust in terms of managing their customers’ finances; for many small 
businesses banks act as financial advisers as well as lenders. In a successful trust 
relationship, banks would not encourage borrowing which was not in the customer’s 
best interests. Where banks instead encourage borrowing without reasonable 
expectation of ability to service debt (subprime mortgages, student credit cards etc), 
then the trust relationship is threatened – there is moral hazard. 
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But the discussion of moral hazard of longer standing refers to the possibility that 
banks take on higher risk because of protection from failure by central banks through 
the lender-of-last-resort facility, or depositor protection through state-sponsored 
deposit insurance. There was considerable discussion in the 1930s around the 
introduction of deposit insurance in the US (McCallie 1995), pointing to the risk that 
bank customers would not pressure their banks to hold prudent asset portfolios 
because they were protected by deposit insurance. The free banking literature, more 
generally, identified the a\ctivities of the state as lying behind banking crises, 
precisely because of the moral hazard problem. The argument has been revived for the 
modern context by a leading free banker, Dowd (2009).  
Moral hazard in this context need not involve active concealment of information, just 
inattention on the part of bank customers and either poor monitoring by the central 
bank, or an inability of the central bank to prevent increased risk taking. But the 
current crisis involved all of these things. Structured products which incorporated 
securitised loans in an opaque way concealed the extent of risk attached to them; this 
concealment would appear to have been deliberate. Yet the products were traded in 
spite of their make-up, and therefore the lack of clarity as to the likely risk attached to 
their value. Market sentiment was such as to encourage optimism that downside risks 
were low and asset prices would continue their long rise.  
Because of a longstanding conventional understanding that banks would not be 
allowed to fail, customers did not seek to place deposits on the basis of assessment of 
bank asset portfolios. Rather, although relative returns on deposits were a major factor 
in bank choice, nevertheless the inertia associated with a longstanding trusting 
relationship with a particular bank meant that many bank customers continued to deal 
with the bank they had always dealt with (often continuing family habits of trust in a 
particular bank). However, because banks themselves trusted the central bank to 
provide support to prevent them from failing, they took on additional risk which 
brought about the prospect of failure. 
Free bankers argue that the moral hazard problem can be resolved by removing the 
state from banking altogether (Dowd 2009). Banks would succeed or not on the 
strength of their portfolios. Customers would signal to banks their unhappiness with 
an increased exposure to risk by withdrawing deposits and placing them with 
preferred banks. The market would thus discipline banks which did not behave 
prudently. This proposal falls squarely within the mainstream approach. It is 
presumed that there are objective risk measures to which everyone in principle has 
access. It is presumed that banks risk failure only at the micro level as a result of 
imprudent behaviour; there is no risk of systemic crisis, whereby, if one bank is in 
trouble it is reasonable to doubt other banks. And finally it is presumed that society 
will accept as money the liabilities of banks, where the value of the liabilities changes 
with the value of assets.  
 
It is worthwhile to consider how state support for banks arose in order to address this 
proposal. Chick’s (1986) stages of banking development framework provides the 
basis for this analysis. In the early days of banking, society needed new forms of 
money for trade, since coins were in limited supply. As confidence grew in deposit-
taking banks, their IOUs (first notes, then cheques) became acceptable in payment, 
and now bank deposits form most of the money stock. This only continues to be the 
case if depositors are confident that their deposits keep their value, ie banks hold good 
enough assets to allow them to cash in deposits as required. As long as confidence is 
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maintained, cashing-in deposits is in fact limited. But with bank deposits now the 
main form of money, the economic system would collapse if confidence in bank 
deposits failed. 
 
Once depositors started keeping their deposits with banks and payments stayed within 
the banking system, banks learnt that, not only could they lend out the deposits 
already made, but they could also make additional loans by placing new deposits in 
the borrowers’ accounts. This provided a boost to economic growth because 
investment could be financed ahead of saving. Banks’ reserves were therefore less 
than deposits (ie technically not all deposits could be cashed in at once). But the 
system worked as long as depositors continued to keep their payments within the 
banking system, ie as long as confidence in the banks was maintained. 
 
Central banks took on the role of promoting confidence in banks by encouraging 
prudent behaviour (normally in the form of specifying the ratio of total assets to be 
held liquid as reserves, as well as monitoring and supervising the banks). But they 
also undertook to provide liquidity as lender-of-last-resort; the fact that this facility 
was available made its use less necessary, since it promoted confidence in the banks. 
Finally systems of deposit insurance were set up in case rescue was impossible, again 
promoting customer confidence.  
 
This system worked well and served the needs of bank customers and society more 
generally. But it created tensions. First, tensions grew between the central banks’ need 
to control bank behaviour to maintain confidence and the banks’ drive for profits. The 
success of the central bank supporting the banks provided the basis for the rapid 
growth of the rest of the financial sector in the 1960s and 1970s and banks saw their 
market share threatened. The financial sector (including banks) succeeded in 
pressuring governments to deregulate so that financial institutions could compete in 
each others’ markets. As a by-product of banks’ need to protect market share they 
became proactive in creating credit, pushing loans rather than responding to 
customers’ needs, threatening the conventional trust relationship. Capital adequacy 
ratios were introduced in the 1980s to address this, but just encouraged banks to 
securitise loans and seek off-balance sheet sources of profit, all of which laid the 
foundations for the crisis. 
 
The second tension was between the need for banking to be competitive in order to 
provide the best, low-cost service to customers on the one hand, and the need for 
banks to be large enough to make them less vulnerable to failure on the other. The 
natural state to which banking settles is oligopoly, which provides stability (which is 
in the interests of customers) but also gives banks market power (against the interests 
of customers). The result of these two tensions is the ‘too big to fail’ issue. Larger 
banks were seen as more secure, not just because of their greater ability to protect 
themselves from adverse developments, but also because the authorities would not 
contemplate their failure (either for political reasons, or more generally because it 
would threaten the payments system and thus the whole functioning of the economy). 
This is the moral hazard, that insurance in the form of the lender-of-last-resort facility 
encourages banks to take higher risks. 
 
The crisis which resulted was therefore due to two forces. One force was the 
increasingly imprudent behaviour of banks which was allowed by deregulation and 
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the increasing fragility of the financial system as a whole as a result of increased 
leveraging by financial institutions, companies and households. Once some asset 
prices reversed their rise, cash flow problems arose, defaults occurred which caused 
asset sales and further falls in asset prices. The financial system was so-
interconnected worldwide that the problems were systemic. The other force was the 
turnaround in confidence in banks. The state’s promotion of confidence in banks had 
been so successful that customers had not considered failures as a possibility (in the 
UK at least). But once the banks’ problems became a matter for public discussion and 
there was uncertainty as to whether the lender-of-last-resort facility would be used in 
practice, and as to the details of deposit insurance, confidence in banks fell. This too 
was systemic; while Northern Rock was the main focus of attention in the UK, 
concerns grew as to the viability of other banks. Banking only works if confidence is 
maintained so that deposits are not withdrawn. If confidence fails, the system cannot 
work. 
 
The conventional relationship between state and banks was thus based on trust that 
each would conform to the implicit agreement that the central bank would support the 
banks in exchange for the banks acting effectively as an arm of the state in supplying 
the bulk of money. Similarly moral sentiments played a part in the relations between 
banks and their customers. While mainstream theory would see moral hazard in the 
form of conditions allowing opportunistic behaviour, political economic theory sees a 
much wider erosion of moral sentiments in relations between banks, the central bank 
and bank customers. 
 
 
Policy Implications 
 
The banking crisis has provoked active discussion on policy to prevent repetition, and 
the moral hazard issue has loomed large. But how that issue is addressed depends on 
how it is understood. We have seen that the framework for mainstream theory 
produces a very different understanding from the political economy framework. 
Because mainstream theory focuses on rational optimising behaviour, it would 
suggest a change to regulatory restrictions on opportunities for optimising behaviour 
which allow undue risk exposure, and a change to incentives (eg the terms of bonus 
payments). A leading policy proposal is to use regulation to restrict retail banks, 
which would enjoy central bank support, to ‘utility’ functions, ie to traditional 
banking (King 2009). This would prevent much of the risk-taking activities which 
banks had become involved in, and force banks to focus much more on their 
traditional functions of providing payments services and creating credit. 
 
In their traditional role, Chick’s analysis shows that banks acted, effectively, as agents 
of the state. They were able to rely on customers keeping their deposits with banks 
and running payments through their accounts because of the confidence that the 
deposits were safe. This confidence was based on the support of the central bank. In 
return the banks provided the economy with a payments system. This deal was 
threatened when banks strove to increase market share and profits by imprudent 
means, while still relying on state support. But the argument for a return to traditional 
banking is sometimes put as returning from ‘too big to fail’ to ‘small enough to fail’. 
But the opposite should be the case; the critical thing is to prevent bank failure. 
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Confidence is potentially a fragile thing, and yet that is the foundation for money and 
banking. That is why retail banks should not normally be allowed to fail. 
 
But if we are to maintain the payments system on which the economy depends, then 
the banks need to observe their side of the deal. They need to return to more prudent 
behaviour, which means restricting their activities and thus their exposure to risk. 
Other financial activities, by banks or other financial institutions, would still 
potentially be risky, exposing the institutions to the possibility of failure. These risks 
would be systemic because of interconnectedness of portfolios. But they would not be 
systemic in the sense of threatening confidence in the payments system if the banks 
were excluded from these activities. It is this latter type of systemic risk which the 
state needs to address as the highest priority, providing the lender-of-last-resort 
facility to banks (if regulation and supervision are not enough to protect them). As 
long as confidence is maintained, and trust conventions observed, banks are able to 
create credit again in the confidence that new deposits will stay in the system. A 
stable financial environment more generally further sustains banks’ willingness to 
make loans to customers. 
 
While banks were always motivated to make profit for their shareholders, there was a 
culture of prudence in traditional banking, promoted no doubt by informal exchanges 
with the central bank as well as by regulation. There are some simple regulations 
which could be introduced in an effort to return to that prudence, such as limits on 
mortgage loans in relation to income and value of property, and stricter conditions for 
customers to acquire credit cards. 
 
But regulation is not enough, and is potentially counter-productive. We have seen that 
capital adequacy requirements encouraged behaviour which made the financial 
system more fragile. Changing restrictions and incentives will not succeed in 
preventing crises if in fact behaviour does not conform to the rational, optimising 
model. If in fact behaviour is governed by concerns with process, and trust has broken 
down to such an extent that processes are unacceptable (within banks, between banks 
and customers, between banks and the central bank), then policy needs to focus on 
making those processes work better, so that trust is restored. What is required is a 
change in banking culture so that it is more focused on customers’ needs and the 
needs of society more generally (as a quid pro quo for central bank support). The 
cooperative/credit union/savings bank culture provides a good model, and indeed this 
sector has been notably successful in attracting business during the crisis. Changing 
culture is not easy, but is nevertheless necessary if banks are to become fully 
functional again. The shocking experience of the crisis may provide enough of an 
impetus for change to happen (as it did for example in response to the Enron scandal, 
which was the outcome of a culture which sanctioned corporate deception). 
 
The state therefore has a role to play in changing bank regulation in order to return to 
traditional banks which would then have central bank support. But it also has a role to 
play in changing banking culture. As Frey and Benz (2005) argued in the wake of the 
Enron scandal, there is scope for the private sector to learn from public governance. 
The current situation of government part-ownership of some banks points the way to 
an opportunity to change culture from within. Were the government to fully 
nationalise a bank, there would be scope for taking the lead in the change in culture. 
At the same time, it has been a major impediment for the government in the run-up to 
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the crisis not to have the kind of detailed up-to-date expertise in banking which would 
have altered the government to what was happening, and also provided the knowledge 
on which to base the policy response. These opportunities are already available to 
governments which have traditionally had a presence in the banking sector, as in 
Portugal. 
 
As long as the state provides money through private sector banks, however, the 
tensions noted above remain. ‘Traditional’ banks would be at a competitive 
disadvantage if they were denied access to profitable activities, such as in asset-
backed securities and derivatives markets, and might therefore require some subsidy. 
However there would also be the tendency observed over history for banks to become 
large, and thus to exercise market power over customers, which might also require 
some ameliorative state intervention. It could be argued that the solution would be to 
completely nationalise the payments system, eg as a gyro system (as considered by 
Kregel 2010). But then we would lose the peculiar ability of banks to create credit on 
the basis of a fractional reserve system. A banking system which works well is a 
tremendous aid to the economy, but to achieve this again will require a new deal 
between banks and the state.   
  
Further, given the normal potential for financial instability (as analysed by H Minsky 
1982, 1986), the central bank may again need to call on the lender-of-last-resort 
facility. Further costs may be incurred if there are systemic problems elsewhere in the 
financial system. And the problems may again be global. There is therefore a good 
argument for either a global insurance fund to cover deposits in extreme cases where 
retail banks cannot be rescued, or else a global transactions tax, along the lines of the 
original Tobin tax proposal, which would have the additional benefit of reducing the 
velocity of international capital flows. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is certainly scope for immoral behaviour in the financial sector, as elsewhere. 
But the analysis suggests that this goes much further than the conventional 
understanding of moral hazard, which does not depart clearly from the mainstream 
view of rational self-interested behaviour. Moral behaviour arises from successful 
social relations, structured (and thus both enabled and constrained) by a sound 
institutional environment. Further, moral and immoral behaviour are not separable 
from rational behaviour, since sentiment (including moral sentiments) are 
foundational to knowledge and reason. Our analysis of what caused the financial 
crisis and how it should be addressed should therefore draws on theory which 
incorporates (moral) sentiments and social structures from the start. 
 
 
 
References 
 
Akerlof, G and Schiller, R (2009) Animal Spirits. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Alkire, S (2009) ‘Amartya Sen’, in Peil and van Staveren (eds). 
 13 
 
Arrow, K J (1963) ‘Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care’, 
American Economic Review 53(5): 941-69. 
 
Ashraf, N, Camerer, C F and Loewenstein, G (2005) ‘Adam Smith, Behavioral 
Economist’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(3): 131-45. 
Backhouse, R E (2005) ‘Economists, values and ideology: a neglected agenda’, Revue 
de philosophie économique 11, pp. 49-73. 
Bandura, A (1991) ‘Social Cognitive Theory of Moral Thought and Action’, in W 
Kurtines and J Gerwitz (eds), Handbook of Moral Behaviour and Development, vol. 
1. New Jersey: Lowrence Erlbaum [check] 
 
Becker, G S (1976) The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press. 
 
Boyd, R (2008) ‘Manners and Morals: David Hume on Civility, Commerce, and the 
Social Construction of Difference’, in C Wennerlind and M Schabas (eds), David 
Hume’s Political Economy. London: Routledge. 
 
Brennan, H G and Waterman, A M C (eds) (1994) Economics and Religion: Are They 
Distinct? Boston: Kluwer. 
 
Chick, V (1986/1992) ‘The Evolution of the Banking System and the Theory of 
Saving, Investment and Interest’, Economies et Sociétés, serie Monnaie et Production 
no. 3, 111-26, reprinted in P Arestis and S C Dow (eds) On Money, Method and 
Keynes. London: Macmillan. 
 
Damasio, A R (1994) Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New 
York: Avon Books. 
 
Davis, J B (2003) The Theory of the Individual in Economics: Identity and Value. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Dembe, A E and Boden, L I (2000) ‘Moral Hazard: A Question of Morality?’, New 
Solutions 10(3). 257-79 
 
Dow, A C and Dow, S C (1985) ‘Animal Spirits and Rationality’, in T Lawson and H 
Pesaran (eds) Keynes’s Economics: Methodological Issues. London: Routledge. 
 
Dow, S C (2010) ‘Cognition, Market Sentiment and Financial Instability’, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, forthcoming. 
 
Dowd, K (2009) ‘Moral Hazard and the Financial Crisis’, Cato Journal 29(1): 142-
66. 
 
Drakopoulos, S (1991) Values and Economic Theory. Aldershot: Avebury. 
 
 14 
Duran, M A (2007) ‘Norm-based Behaviour and Corporate Malpractice’, Journal of 
Economic Issues 151(1): 221-41. 
 
Fehr, E and Fischbacher, U (2002) ‘Why Social Preferences Matter – The Impact of 
Non-selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives’, Economic Journal 
112(478): C1-33. 
 
Frey, B S and Benz, M (2005) ‘Can Private Learn from Public Governance?’, 
Economic Journal, 115(507): F377-396. 
 
Gerrard, B (1992) ‘Human Logic in Keynes’s Thought: an Escape from the Cartesian 
Vice’, in P Arestis and V Chick (eds), Recent Developments in Post Keynesian 
Economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Gigerenzer, G (2007) Gut Feelings: The Intelligence of the Unconscious.  
 
Gigerenzer, G and Selten, T (2001) Bounded Rationality. Cambridge MA: MIT 
Press. 
 
Graafland, J J (2009) ‘Utilitarianism’, in Peil and van Staveren (eds). 
 
Hayek, F A von (1976) ‘The Mirage of Social Justice’, in Law, Legislation, and 
Liberty, vol. 2.Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hirata, J (2009) ‘Hedonism’, in Peil and van Staveren (eds). 
 
Hughes, P (2008) 'Trust in Behavioural Game Theory and Institutional Economics: A 
Smithian Approach', presentation to SGPE conference. 
 
King, M (2009) Speech at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/ 
speech406.pdf 
 
Kregel, J (2010) ‘No Going Back: Why We Cannot Restore Glass-Steagall’s 
Segregation of Banking and Finance’, Levy Institute Public Policy Brief no. 107 
 
McCallie, J D (1995) ‘Early Warnings of the Hazards of Federal Deposit Insurance at 
the Time of its Inception’, History of Political Economy 27(4): 687-73. 
 
Minsky, H P (1982) Inflation, Recession and Economic Policy. Brighton: Wheatsheaf
  
Minsky, H P (1986) Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
 
Minsky, M (2006) The Emotion Machine. Simon & Schuster. 
 
Montes, L (2004) Adam Smith in Context. London: Palgrave Macmillan, chapter 4. 
 
Pauly, M V (1968) ‘The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment’, American 
Economic Review 53(5): 531-7. 
 
 15 
Peil J and van Staveren, I (eds) (2009) Handbook of Economics and Ethics. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Smith, A ([1759] 1976) The Theory of Moral Sentiments, edited by D. D. Raphael and 
A. L. Macfie. Oxford: Clarendon. 
 
Stiglitz, J and Weiss, M (1981) ‘Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Competition’, American Economic Review 71: 22-44.  
 
Young, J T (1997) Economics as a Moral Science: The Political Economy of Adam 
Smith. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
